Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 9

Issue 4

Article 6

10-1-1992

Divine Simplicity: A New Defense
William F. Vallicella

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Vallicella, William F. (1992) "Divine Simplicity: A New Defense," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 9 : Iss. 4 , Article 6.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19929441
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol9/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

DIVINE SIMPLICITY: A NEW DEFENSE
William F. Vallicella

The doctrine of divine simplicity, according to which God is devoid of physical or metaphysical complexity, is widely believed to be incoherent. I argue
that although two prominent recent attempts to defend it fail, it can be defended against the charge of obvious incoherence. The defense rests on the
isolation and rejection of a crucial assumption, namely, that no property is
an individual. I argue that there is nothing in our ordinary concepts of property and individual to warrant the assumption, and that once the assumption
is rejected, the way is clear to viewing the divine attributes as self-exemplifying properties whose self-exemplification entails their identity with an individual.
Among the entailments of the classical theistic doctrine of divine simplicity
as found in Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas are such baffling claims as that
God is identical with each of his essential properties; that these properties
are identical with each other; and that there is no distinction in God between
essence and existence. If true, the simplicity doctrine promises the theist
considerable advantages: a possible way around the Euthyphro Paradox,' an
explanation of why God is a necessary being,2 and a premise for a short
non-modal ontological argument. 3 But not only does the doctrine promise
these advantages, it also seems to be an inescapable logical consequence of
the central theistic idea that, necessarily, God is the creator and sustainer of
everything distinct from himself. This has been rigorously and persuasively
argued by Brian Leftow. 4 The argument in outline is that since God cannot
create his own nature, and since everything distinct from God is existentially
dependent on God, God is identical with his nature.
Unfortunately, however, the simplicity doctrine will strike many philosophers as it does Quentin Smith, who writes that "this doctrine is plainly
self-contradictory, and its hold on some people's minds testifies to the predominance of faith over intellectual coherence in some Christian circles."5
And indeed it does seem self-contradictory to say that God, an individual, is
identical with his essential properties, since this seems to imply that God is
a property and hence not an individual. 6 And so the simplicity doctrine seems
to issue in the absurdity that God both is and is not an individual. It also
seems to entail that God both has and does not have a plurality of properties. 7
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For if God by definition is omniscient, omnipotent, etc., then he has a plurality of properties; but if these properties are identical with one another, then
he does not have a plurality of properties, but exactly one property. One might
even argue that if this one property is simplicity, then God cannot possess
the property of existence. Hence if God is simple, he does not exist, and if
he exists, he is not simple!8
Although Leftow has shown that what he calls the Identity Thesis (the core
of the simplicity doctrine) can be derived from the claim that, necessarily,
God creates everything distinct from himself, he leaves largely undiscussed
the question of the logical coherence of the Identity Thesis itself.9 If this
thesis is inconsistent, no argument in its support can be sound. What is
needed, then, is a direct assault on the consistency question.
My aim here is accordingly modest: not to argue for the truth of the doctrine, but to argue for its consistency. Even more modestly, perhaps, my aim
is to show, contra Smith, Plantinga, and a host of others, that it is not obviously inconsistent or otherwise repugnant to the intellect. But before advancing to the positive task, we do well to examine a couple of extant approaches
both of which in my judgment fail.

1. The Approach of Stump and Kretzmann
According to Stump and Kretzmann, the names of the divine attributes
... are all identical in reference but different in sense, referring in various ways
to the one actual entity which is God himself or designating various manifestations of it. [Which is it? Different ways of referring to one thing, or
reference to different things?] 'Perfect power' and 'perfect knowledge' are
precise analogues for 'the morning star' and 'the evening star': non-synonymous expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the
same thing ... .'Perfect power is identical with perfect knowledge' does not
entail that power is identical with knowledge any more than the fact that the
summit of a mountain's east slope is identical with the summit of its west
slope entails the identity of the slopes. 10

This passage is confusing, employing as it does two distinct analogies that
are dubious in themselves and not obviously compatible with each other. The
Fregean analogy compares identity of properties with identity of individuals:
the implication is that just as there is no problem in understanding how the
morning star can be identical with the evening star once we distinguish the
sense and reference of the relevant expressions, so also there is no problem
in understanding how perfect power can be identical with perfect knowledge:
you just distinguish the senses of these terms from each other and from their
common referent. The senses are distinct, but the referent, God, is one and
the same. Presumably, the senses of "perfect power" and "perfect knowledge"
are the properties perfect power and perfect knowledge, respectively, which,
we are told, are different manifestations of God. In Fregean jargon, they are
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different Darstellungsweisen, modes of presentation, of one and the same
thing. But this implies that the two divine attributes in question are not
identical, but as distinct as the senses of "morning star" and "evening star."
The point is that the Fregean gambit requires the distinctness of senses in
order to account for the informativeness of the identity claim; and so if the
attributes in question are senses, they must be really distinct. If, on the other
hand, the attributes are not senses but identical with each other and with God,
then we need to be told what the distinct senses of "perfect power" and
"perfect knowledge" are. If no answer is forthcoming, the Fregean analogy
collapses.
It wiIl not help to say that omniscience and omnipotence differ as concepts
("in the mind") but are identical as properties ("outside the mind"), for even
if this is true, it has not been explained how the properties can be identical
with one another and with God. The problem is one of metaphysics, not of
philosophy of language. The problem is to explain how God can be identical
with his properties, not to explain how informative identity statements like
"God is omniscience" and "Omniscience is omnipotence" are possible.
Frege's Sinn/Bedeutung distinction may help us with the latter problem; but
it seems unavailing when applied to the former.
Whereas the Fregean analogy suggests that perfect power and perfect
knowledge are distinct as distinct modes of presentation of one and the same
thing = God, the slope/summit analogy suggests something quite different,
namely, that the attributes are identical. This is of course more in line with
what is needed. What the analogy is intended to suggest is that even if F-ness
and G-ness are distinct, perfect F-ness and perfect G-ness can be identical,
just as the slopes are distinct shy of the summit, but identical at the summit.
But this analogy, although a neat representation of the identity of perfect
power and perfect knowledge assuming the coherence of this identity, does
nothing to show the coherence or refute the charge of incoherence. One might
as well try to prove the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity by producing
a can of "Three-in-One" oil. II The intellect has exigencies of which the
picture-loving imagination knows nothing.

2. Mann s Approach
It is one thing to say that God is identical with each of his properties; quite
another to say that he is identical with each of his property-instances. Mann's
way, derived from Aquinas, is the latter.12 Accordingly, God is identical, not
with omniscience, but with his (instantiation of) omniscience. And similarly
with the other attributes. If we take this tack, we avoid the consequence that
God is a property with al\ its supposedly absurd implications.
Mann has recently conceded to T. V. Morris l3 that the property instance
view faces a damaging objection: if God is (identically) an instance of a
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property P, then God is dependent on P to be what he is, namely, an instance
of P. The divine aseity is thus compromised. As Mann puts it,
It looks as though a simplicist is confronted with a dilemma. If he adopts the
property instance view, then he violates the thesis that God exists a se. If he
adopts the property view, then he is subject to the withering scorn heaped on
that view by Alvin Plantinga. 14

Mann would avoid the dilemma by grasping both horns. "What I propose
is to identify God's omniscience with omniscience itself."'5 In saying this
Mann clearly evades Morris' objection, but at the price of abandoning the
property instance approach in favor of the property approach. This lays him
open to the Plantinga objection which the original property instance theory
avoided.
Recall that Plantinga's objection was that God cannot be a property since
properties, being abstract, are causally inert, whereas God as traditionally
conceived is an agent. To handle this admittedly powerful objection, Mann
isolates and rejects" ... an unspoken assumption, namely, that properties are
abstract objects, incapable of the personal attributes essential to a traditional
(;onception of God. "16 What they are instead, according to Mann, are "causal
powers." The implication is obvious: " .. .if properties are causal powers and
if God is a property, then he is a causal power."17
But what exactly is Mann's claim here? Clarity bids us distinguish among
the following:
(1) Properties are causal powers.

(2) Properties have causal powers.
(3) Properties confer causal powers on the things that exemplify them.

It would appear that (3) is what Mann has in mind:
P is a property of an object, x, only if P's presence in x confers some causal
power(s) on x. P and Q are the same property if and only if (1) P and Q
confer the same causal powers on their objects and (2) whatever is sufficient
to bring about an instance of P in an object, x, is sufficient to bring about an
instance of Q in x, and vice versa. IS
(3) has some initial plausibility.'9 Suppose it is true. And suppose, even more
charitably, that (3) and (1) express the same or logically equivalent propositions. How does this help Mann's project? How does it show that God, if a
property, is not an abstract object bereft of causal efficacy? For causal powers
are themselves abstract, hence causally inert. I have the power to run 5 miles
in 40 minutes. But this power does not itself have the power to run 5 miles
in 40 minutes. What Mann needs is something along the lines of (2): properties have causal powers. God's being a property would then entail that God
has causal powers. (2), however, is independent of (1) and (3). And so even
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if we grant Mann that all genuine (as opposed to what Mann calls mere "Notre
Dame") properties confer causal powers on their possessors, it does not follow
that all genuine properties have causal powers. Of course, if the simplicity
doctrine is coherent, then there is no difference between God's being and having
causal power(s), but the coherence of the doctrine is precisely what is at issue.
Thus the view that properties are or confer causal powers does not rescue
the simplicity doctrine (in its property form) from Plantinga's objection. So
far, then, we have good reason to think the simplicity doctrine incoherent,
and no reason to think it coherent.

3. Property and Individual: An Untenable Dualism
The doctrine of divine simplicity confronts us with a pair of questions: (i)
How can God be identical with the properties he exemplifies? and (ii) How
can the divine properties be identical with one another? If these two can be
answered, the problem of how essence and existence can be identical in God
should also be amenable to solution. But since this problem harbors special
difficulties, its treatment will be reserved for a separate article.
A short way with (i) would be to say that God just is a property, in which
case there would be no difficulty in understanding how he could be identical
with properties. But this is counterintuitive in the extreme. Properties, although ingredients of the real, are inert ingredients thereof. They neither act
nor react; they neither do nor suffer. Given that God is an agent, he cannot
be a property unless (and this is an important qualification) he is a property
that is identical with an individual. We can therefore agree with Plantinga
when he says that "No property could have created the world; no property
could be omniscient, or indeed, know anything at a11,"20 while disagreeing
with his tacit assumption that no property is an individual.
Thus there is no easy answer to (i). God is in some sense an individual. If
so, how can he be identical with his properties? The problem arises on the
plausible assumption that a categorial chasm divides properties and individuals such that, necessarily, no property is an individual. But this might be an
untenable dualism. It might be that some properties are identical with individuals. But to discuss this further we need to define our terms. Suppose we
agree that
(I)

x is an individual iff (i) x exemplifies properties, (ii) x is not multiply

exemplifiable, and (iii) x is not exemplifiable by anything distinct from
itself;21

and
(P) P is a property iff P is possibly such that it is exemplified. 22

Is (I) adequate? Call every individual other than God an "ordinary" individual, whether it be a continuant, set, event-token, or anything else that is not
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a property or relation. Surely every ordinary individual satisfies clause (i).
Clause (ii) is satisfied since ordinary individuals are not exemplifiable and a
fortiori not multiply exemplifiable. For the same reason, every ordinary individual satisfies clause (iii). So (I) has no counterexample among ordinary
individuals. Nor is God a counterexample to (I). So (I) rules in all individuals.
But does it rule out all properties? Clause (ii) rules out all multiply exemplifialble properties, and clause (iii) rules out all properties P which are such that,
if they are exemplified, they are exemplified by exactly one item other than
P, whether in the actual world, or in all possible worlds. Thus clause (iii)
excludes such properties as being the teacher of Plato, and being identical
to Socrates. So (I) rules out everything normally considered to be a property. (Something exemplifiable only by itself is not normally considered a
property.)
Turning now to (P), we can see that it rules out every ordinary individual,
and rules in every property. So both (P) and (I) seem intuitively adequate:
they capture what we mean by "individual" and "property" across the entire
range of normal cases. But the (P)-(l) pair does not enforce a dichotomy
between individuals and properties; admirably latitudinarian, it allows for
some properties to be identical to individuals. For if a property Q were
exemplifiable only by itself it would count as a property according to (P) but
also as an individual according to (I). Such a non-multiply exemplifiable
self-exemplifying property Q, if exemplified, would not be exemplified by
anything distinct from itself, thus satisfying clause (iii) of (1). Such a property
would be both a property and an individual. As such, it would have some of
the characteristics normally associated with properties, and some of the characteristics normally associated with individuals. Properties, for example, are
necessary beings but causally inert; individuals are capable of exerting causality. And so a thing that is both a property and an individual could be
understood to be both necessary and causally efficacious.
No doubt the above definitions of "individual" and "property" have been
constructed with an eye toward saving divine simplicity from the jaws of
incoherence. But it doesn't follow that the definitions are merely ad hoc or
epicyclic. I would say instead that the usual definitions, according to which,
necessarily, no property is an individual, beg the question against divine simplicity. In so doing they represent an illicit extrapolation beyond what we can
claim to know on the basis of the normal range of cases. They ought to be rejected
in favor of the more modest definitions proposed here which capture everything
that needs to be captured regarding the normal range of cases.

4. Simplicity via Self-Exemplification
Are there any properties identical with individuals? Let us first be clear
that
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(4) Some properties are identical with individuals

is logically compatible with
(5) No property qua property is an individual

and with
(6) The property of being a property is distinct from the property of being
an individual.

(5) and (6) are each undeniable; some sort of distinction between property
and individual is a necessary feature of any conceptual scheme of which we
can conceive. But it does not follow that no thing to which the concept
property applies is a thing to which the concept individual applies.
Are there, then, any properties identical with individuals? Yes, every property whose self-exemplification entails its identity with an individual. Among
these, I shal1 argue, are the divine attributes.
No doubt there are self-exemplifying properties. Examples include existence, self-identity, being a property, being abstract, being self-exemplifying,
being unextended, being inanimate. A curious feature of such properties is that
each is identical with one of the properties it has, namely, itself. (That there are
such partially ontologically simple entities should soften us up for the idea that
there is a wholly ontologically simple entity.) Existence exists, self-identity is
self-identical, etc. But these are all multiply exemplifiable, and thus not candidates for the office of property whose self-exemplification entails its identity
with an individual. Now consider omniscience. It is not obviously self-exemplifying (like the above examples), but it is not obviously non-self-exemplifying
either (like the property of being married to Heidegger). And so the theist is
not barred by logic or any canon of coherence from taking the view that
omniscience is self-exemplifying. If it is self-exemplifying, then omniscience
is omniscient; but not only that, omniscience = an omniscient individual. For
it makes no sense to say that a property distinct from every individual is
all-knowing. This would imply that some such properties are conscious. Although there is the property of being conscious, and the property of being an
accusative of consciousness, the subject of consciousness, that which is conscious, cannot be a property, unless of course it is identical with an individual.
Similarly for the other divine attributes. Since there is no contradiction in
holding that omnipotence is self-exemplifying, there is no logical inconsistency
in the view that omnipotence is omnipotent, and hence identical to an omnipotent
individual. Still, it might be thought absurd to suppose that a property can have
causal efficacy. But there is no absurdity if the property in question is identical
to an individual. Indeed, if omnipotence is omnipotent, then it must be identical
with an individual given the plausible assumption that properties distinct from
individuals are causally inert.
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This allows us to say that each divine attribute is identical to some individual. Of course, it doesn't straightaway follow from this that each attribute
is identical to the same individual in a way that would insure the identity of
the attributes with one another. But it does follow if the divine attributes are
necessarily coextensive. So one can, without contradiction, hold that there is
one individual = God with whom each attribute is identical. And then, given
the transitivity of identity, it would follow that the attributes are identical
with each other.
The argument, then, is this:
(7) Each divine attribute, as both self-exemplifying and such that its possessor cannot be non-conscious, is identical with some individual or
other.

(8) Necessarily, the divine attributes are coextensive.

Therefore
(9) There is exactly one individual with which each attribute is identical.

Therefore, by Transitivity of Identity,
(10) The attributes are identical with each other.

No doubt some will reject (8) by invoking the putative possibility of a being
who has one or more of the divine attributes without having them all, e.g., a
being who is omniscient but not omnipotent, or vice versa. But it is not clear
that this a genuine possibility. Consider the following argument which makes
lise of the characteristic S4 axiom of modal propositional logic, to wit, "Nec
p -+ Nec Nec p:"
(11) If (8) is false, then necessarily, (8) is false.

(12) Possibly, (8) is true.

Therefore, by Modus Tollens,
(13) (8) is true.

This argument appeals in its minor premise to the intuition that it is possible
that the divine attributes be necessarily coextensive. My opponent's intuition,
however, entails that it is impossible that the attributes be necessarily coextensIve as the following argument shows:
(14) Possibly, the attributes are not coextensive.
(15) Necessarily, (14) (from (14) by characteristic S5 axiom: "Poss p
Poss p").

-+

Nec

(16) Impossibly, -(14) (from (15».
(17) It is impossible that the attributes be necessarily coextensive (from (16».
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Since my opponent's intuition entails the questionable (17), I am justified in
holding that it is possible that the attributes be necessarily coextensive,
which, via (11), entails that the attributes are necessarily coextensive. At least
I am as justified in rejecting, as my opponent is in accepting, (17).
The divine attributes, therefore, are both necessarily coextensive and, by
the argument (7)-(10), identical with one another. Note, however, that the
reason for saying that they are identical with one another is not that necessarily coextensive properties are identical - Mann's view, which is false but that each divine attribute is identical with an individual, and the individuals are identical with one another.

5. The Divine Attributes as Haecceities
Having argued that the divine attributes are necessarily coextensive, we must
now confront the different question of whether they are multiply exemplifiable. Is it possible, for instance, that there be two or more omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, etc. beings? If this is a genuine possibility, it rules
out divine simplicity.23 But given the soundness of the foregoing argument
(7)-(10) for the identity of the divine attributes with each other and with God,
it follows that it is not a genuine possibility. For suppose the divine attributes
are exemplified by two beings. Given that each is identical with its attributes,
it would follow by Transitivity of Identity that each is identical with the other,
which contradicts the supposition. Hence the divine attributes are not multiply exemplifiable.
It follows that each divine attribute is a haecceity. Thus omniscience is the
property of being identical to the omniscient being. Given that omniscience
is self-exemplifying, it follows that the property of being identical to the
omniscient being is identical to the omniscient being.
We have now attained the modest goal of this paper. It remains to consider
some objections.

6. Is it Coherent to Suppose that the
Divine Attributes are Self-Exemplifying?
You say that there is no contradiction in holding that omnipotence is self-exemplifying, but arguably there is. Omnipotence is the first-level property of
being all-powerful. First-level properties are properties of individuals. But if
omnipotence is self-exemplifying, it is a property of a property, which contradicts the assumption that omnipotence is a first-level property.
This is no objection to my theory. A first-level property is one that can be
meaningfully predicated of individuals. (Thus being red is first-level, being
numerous is not.) But it does not follow that no first-level property is also a
second-level property. Existence, self-identity, being inanimate, being unextended, being spatially unlocatable, are each both first-level and second-level
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properties. Cartesian minds and extensionless points are unextended, but so
are properties. Cartesian minds, unlike extension less points, are spatially
unlocatable, but so are properties. Omnipotence as self-exemplifying, then,
is both first-level and second-level. The objection collapses once it is realized
that first- and second-level properties do not form mutually disjoint classes.
Note also that if the objection were sound, it would prove too much, for it
would prove that no first-level property is self-exemplifying, which is contradicted by the examples just given.
At this point the objector may just insist that omnipotence, omniscience,
etc. are not self-exemplifying. She may even announce that these are "analytic truths" on the strength of the claim that no property is powerful or
knowledgeable. But this would be but to genuflect before the dogma, already
rejected, that no property is an individual. So it would appear that the objector
can do no better than to beg the question against us.

7. Modal Uniformity and the Supervenience of Omniscience
If God is identical with his properties, then they are "modally uniform:" there
can be no distinction between essential and accidental properties of God,
which is to say, all such properties are essentia].24 This of course presents a
problem: we want to say, among other things, that God contingently created
this world, that he might have created a different possible world, or no world
at all. If so, it cannot be the case that God is identical with the property of
having created this world. For that would entail that, necessarily, God created
this world.
Here is a second form of the difficulty. Although God is essentially omniscient in that he knows all the conjuncts of whichever conjunction of propositions happens to be the conjunction of all true propositions, he is not
essentially such that he knows the conjunction of all truths. For this conjunction is contingent, containing as it does such contingent propositions as
Kasparov succeeded Karpov as world chess champion. Simply put, the content of omniscience might have been otherwise. Hence God cannot be identical with the property of knowing the conjunction of (what in fact are) all
truths.
These problems are sidestepped easily enough. The simplicity theorist need
not hold that God is identical with all his properties; he need only hold that
he is identical with all his essential properties. Thus we cannot accept the
Augustinian idea that a simple being "is what it has" (quod habet hoc est)
without qualifications. 25 For taken full strength, it implies that a simple being
has no accidental properties. The property of having created this world, however, is arguably an accidental property of God, and thus not a property with
which God can be identical. The same holds for the property of knowing the
conjunction of all truths.
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Having said this, we immediately confront another difficulty. It has been
suggested (e.g., by T. V. Morris 26 ) that omniscience is a property that supervenes on infinitely many properties like knowing that Fischer beat Spassky
in 1972. As Morris defines it, "If a property F supervenes [upon] a property
G, then an instance of F essentially depends on there being some instance of
G in association with which it exists, in the sense that no instance of F could
exist unless some underlying instance of G existed simultaneously. "27 If so,
God cannot be omniscient without having infinitely many properties. This
problem is avoided, in part, if simplicity is construed as the doctrine that God
is identical with his essential properties. Then we need not say that God is
identical with the contingently had property of knowing that Fischer beat
Spassky in 1972. But there are also such properties as knowing that 7 + 5 =
12, knowing that 7 is prime, etc. and these are such that God has them in
every possible world, hence they are "essential" to God in one standard use
of this term. If God is identical with such properties, then either he is infinitely many properties, or they are but one property. Neither disjunct is
acceptable. They clearly cannot be one property, for they are not even coextensive.
This forces a further clarification. The claim that God is identical with all
his essential properties admits of two interpretations depending on how we
construe "essential." On the "standard" possible worlds interpretation, P is
an essential property of x if and only if x has P in every world in which x
exists. Couple this with a liberal view of properties, and the result is that the
following count 'among my essential properties: being such that 2 + 2 ~ 4,
being a sparkplug if a sparkplug, and so on. It is easy to see that each
individual has nondenumerably many such essential properties. Thus there is
a sense in which each thing has an "infinite essence." But this should give
us pause. What do truths of logic and arithmetic have to do with my essence
or nature?
Thus it is natural to distinguish between essential properties as defined
above, and a proper subset of these which might be called quidditative properties. Accordingly, being sentient, being human, being rational would be
among my quidditative properties, whereas being such that 2 + 2 = 4 and its
ilk would be among my merely essential properties. There is surely some sort
of distinction here. In the case of God, omniscience would count among his
quidditative properties, while knowing that 7 + 5 = 12 would be among his
merely essential properties. The distinction is perhaps as follows. Quidditative properties are such that everything that possesses them does so essentially. (This lays down a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a
property's being quidditative.) Knowing that 7 + 5 = 12, in contrast, is had
essentially by God, but only accidentally by Mann. Hence it is not a quidditative property.
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Given the distinction, the simplicity theorist need only hold that God is
identical with his quidditative properties.
Accordingly, God is identical with omniscience, but not with the properties
upon which omniscience supervenes. In sum, God is identical with his nature,
but not with his trivially essential properties (e.g., the property of being such
that 2 + 2 = 4), or with properties like the property of knowing that 2 + 2 =
4, or with his accidental properties (e.g., the property of having created this
world, the property of being believed by Plantinga to be non-simple).
Nevertheless, the idea that omniscience is supervenient may lead to trouble.
Por if God = omniscience, and omniscience supervenes on other properties,
then God supervenes on other properties in a way that appears fatal to the
divine aseity. But the simplicity theorist, although admitting that, necessarily,
God is omniscient if and only if God knows every truth, is under no obligation
to think of omniscience as supervenient. For he may think of it as supervened
upon. God is omniscient not because he knows all truths; he knows all truths
because he is omniscient. God's knowing that p, q, r, etc. thus depends or
supervenes upon God's omniscience and the truth of p, q, r, etc. There does
not appear to be in this any threat to the divine aseity.
One final consideration. If God is omniscient, and omniscience entails
being knowledgeable (in the sense that, necessarily, whatever is omniscient
is knowledgeable), does it follow that God is identical with being knowledgeable? If it did, I would exemplify God by virtue of exemplifying knowledgeability - a bizarre result. This outcome is easily avoided if we realize that
omniscience does not entail being knowledgeable in a way that will cause a
problem. For if being knowledgeable = being imperfectly knowledgeable,
then omniscience most assuredly does not entail being knowledgeable. On
the other hand, if being knowledgeable = being perfectly knowledgeable, then
the entailment holds, but without the bizarre result. For nothing distinct from
God is perfectly knowledgeable. Perhaps knowledgeability may be viewed
as a genus of which perfect and imperfect knowledgeability are species. But
such generic knowledgeability is plausibly construed as disjunctive: x is
knowledgeable (rational, powerful, etc.) if and only if x is either perfectly or
imperfectly knowledgeable (rational, powerful, etc.) Hence there are no generic properties of knowledgeability, power and rationality to give rise to
difficulties. As D. M. Armstrong has compellingly argued, disjunctive "properties" are not genuine properties. 28

8. Conclusion
Although much more needs to be said, what has been said suffices to deflect
the main accusations of incoherence. This is a good thing for theists, since
as Leftow has shown, the simplicity doctrine is entailed by the central theistic
belief that, necessarily, God is the creator and sustainer of everything distinct

Faith and Philosophy

520

from himself, together with the idea that God cannot create his nature. 29 The
next step is to examine what it could mean to say that in God existence and
nature are identical. This daunting task is wisely reserved for the sequel. 30

9. Appendix: Divine Simplicity and Logically Simple Propositions
Does God's absolute ontological simplicity demand that literal and religiously adequate God-talk consist, at least in part, of logically simple propositions? Barry Miller answers in the affirmative: the possibility of literal
God-talk adequate to a simple God rests on the possibility of logically simple
propositions such that, if there are no logically simple propositions, there can
be no literal and religiously adequate God-talk. 31 A logically simple proposition is one that lacks not only propositional components, but also sub-propositional components. Thus atomic propositions are not logically simple in
Miller's sense, since they contain sUb-propositional parts. A proposition of
the form "a is F," though atomic, exhibits subject-predicate complexity.
What I shall argue, contra Miller, is that literal and adequate talk and
thought about the simple God do not entail the possibility of logically simple
propositions. This is a good thing, since, as I shall also argue, there are and
can be no logically simple propositions. So I will need to show how logically
complex propositions .can be adequate to an Absolute that is simple. I thereby
engage one of deepest questions in metaphysics: How can we say or think
anything about the non-dual Absolute Reality without distorting it? Or are
we in the Tractarian predicament of having to fall silent before that of which
we cannot speak?

On the Complex Grasp o/the Simple
Given that God is ontologically simple, God is identical with each of his
attributes. But why must a proposition about the simple God be logically
simple? Miller writes,
To have accepted the strict propriety of using a name and first-level predicates
of God would have been to accept that there was a distinction to be drawn
between the referent of the name and the attributes to which the predicates
refer. We should therefore have had to admit that there was, after all, a
distinction between him and his existence, and between him and his attributes, and thus that he was not absolutely simple. We had a choice - either
to say that God was absolutely simple, or to say that he could have a name
and receive first-level predicates that refer to real rather than to merely
Cambridge properties. What we could not do consistently was to affirm both
these positions together. It is not that we could not name God, though some
superior being could: the fact is that not even God could name God.32
Miller appears to be making two assumptions, both necessary for the validity of his argument. The first is that
(1)

No property is an individual.
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The second is that
(2) Names refer only to individuals; predicates refer only to properties.

It follows from (1) and (2) that anything that can be named is an individual

and not a property, and anything that can be predicated is a property and not
an individual; hence nothing simple can be named or have any property
predicated of it. Literally true propositions about a simple God must therefore
be logically simple. Complex propositions would import a false complexity
into the divine nature.
But if God is indeed simple, shouldn't we conclude that (1) is false? We
begin by noting that "God is simple" can be construed in three different ways.
A. It could be taken to mean that God transcends, while leaving intact, the
property-individual dualism. Thus God would be neither an individual nor a
property in univocal senses of these terms. This is Miller's approach.33
B. On a second construal of "God is simple," God falls on one or the other
side of the individual-property dualism. Thus Alvin Plantinga thinks that if
God is identical with his properties, then God is himself a property, hence an
abstract object, and therefore without causal efficacy.34 But one might just as
well argue that if God is identical with his properties, then the properties are
one individual, hence concrete, and therefore causally efficacious. These
arguments neutralize each other, forcing us to examine the assumption they
both rest on, namely, that no property is an individual. The simplicity theorist
is by no means compelled to say that God is a causally inert abstract object,
for he may reject (I). But even if he, like Miller, accepts (1), he may avoid
Plantinga's conclusion by saying that God transcends the dualism of property
and individual. Plantinga has not refuted the simplicity doctrine.
C. Surely someone who maintains that the Absolute Reality is free of
internal distinctions is not holding that it falls on one side of some distinction-pair. Plausibly construed, the simplicity claim is rather that God is neither an individual nor a property (thus transcending the individual-property
dualism) or both an individual and a property. Miller's view seems to be that
God transcends the individual-property dualism. The view defended above is
the quite different idea that the dualism is untenable, that God is both an
individual and a property.
If I am right in the main body of this paper, there is nothing obviously
incoherent in the idea that the simple God is at once both a self-exemplifying
property and an individual. We are now in a position to see that literal talk
about a simple God does not require logically simple propositions.
Given that every self-exemplifying property is identical with at least one
of its properties, it follows that the logical complexity of a proposition is
compatible with the (partial) ontological simplicity of what the proposition
is about. For example, the logical complexity of the proposition expressed
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by "Self-identity is self-identical" is compatible with the identity of self-identity with itself, and thus with the partial ontological simplicity of self-identity.
The literal truth of the proposition in question does not entail that self-identity
is distinct from itself. Nor does the literal truth of "Existence exists" entail
that existence is not existence. There is such a thing as self-predication. Thus
there is no reason to think that logically complex propositions cannot be
adequate to the wholly simple God. The literal truth of the proposition expressed by "God is omniscient" does not entail that God is distinct from
omniscience, that God merely has or exemplifies omniscience, for "God" may
be construed as referring to a self-exemplifying property that is identical with
all its attributes.
It might be thought that the need for logically simple propositions could
be avoided without the rejection of (1). One might say that God is a self-exemplifying property but not also an individual. This would obviate the need
for logically simple propositions, but it does seem that Plantinga is right in
holding that no mere property (i.e., a property distinct from every individual)
could be an agent who created the world. So it seems to me that (1) should
be rejected.

Are There Logically Simple Propositions?
I have just argued that philosophical theology has no need of logically simple
propositions. What I will now argue is that, whether we need them or not,
there are and can be no logically simple propositions (LSPs).
Since LSPs are not predications, they do not say something about something in the way that "a is F' predicates being F of a, or "Fs exist" predicates
instantiation of the property of being F. So if a LSP is about a thing, it can
be about it only in the way names are about individuals, or predicates are
about properties. But neither names nor predicates have truth-values. Neither
"Socrates" nor .... .is wise" are true or false. So it is completely unclear how
a LSP can have a truth-value.
It is also completely unclear how any intellect like ours could grasp a
proposition devoid of logical parts, let alone believe or know such a proposition. To believe that it is snowing, for example, is to believe something
logically complex, something formulatable perhaps by the sentence "Snow
is falling." So even if there are logically simple propositions, they could not
be accusatives of minds like ours. And if propositions are defined as the
possible accusatives of belief and knowledge, then the point is stronger still:
there cannot be any logically simple propositions.
Miller's examples of LSPs are all of them inconclusive. Consider the German "Es regnet" ("It is raining"). As Miller correctly notes, the "es" is
grammatical filler, and so the sentence can be pared down to "Regnet," which
is no doubt grammatically simple. He then argues:
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Now there is no question of 'Regnet' being a predicate; for as a proposition
it has a complete sense, whereas as a predicate it could have only incomplete
sense. Hence, 'Regner' and propositions like it seem to be logically simple. 35

I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that Mi11er is simply confusing propositions with the sentences used to express them.
From the fact that the sentence "Regnet" is grammatically simple, containing as it does neither a name nor a predicate, it scarcely follows that the
proposition expressed by the sentence is logically simple. My point is sustained even if we acquiesce in Mi11er's usage, according to which a proposition is ..... an expression to which truth values can be assigned ... "36 rather than
the sense of an expression to which truth values can be assigned. My argument is then that the grammatical simplicity of an expression E does not entail
the logical simplicity of the sense expressed by E. Miller admits that there is
a distinction between grammatical and logical simplicity;37 if so, it cannot be
a sentence that is logically simple, it must be the sentence's sense, what I call
the proposition and what Frege called "der Gedanke," the thought. Once this
distinction is granted, a gap opens up that prevents a move from the simplicity
of a sentence to the simplicity of its sense.
In sum, there are conclusive reasons for rejecting LSPs, and no conclusive
reasons for accepting them. And as shown in the preceding section, we don't
need them anyway. The ontologically simple God can be adequately desc:ribed by logically complex propositions.
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